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Despite efforts to codify a new conception of sovereignty limited by international law 
and norms, China has retained the traditional view of sovereignty that gives it absolute 
control within its territory and prohibits all external interference. Given China’s growing 
role as a power in the region and world, it is important to comprehend their views in 
order to understand how they will factor into disputes with other nations and 
organizations and potentially predict when they may occur. In this thesis, I will examine 
how China applies their conception of sovereignty to its dealings with other nations, both 
when they challenge China’s sovereignty and in how China goes about negotiating with 
them, and international organizations, specifically when these organizations create 
policies that may infringe on a nation’s sovereignty. 
Given the growing number, size and importance of international organizations, it is 
important to understand China’s reaction to them when they pursue policies to restrict 
sovereignty through international governance. Chapter 1 examines China’s reactions to 
three growing trends of international governance spurred by these organizations and finds 
that even if they run counter to China’s views China does not use is using its position in 
these organizations to counter these trends. Next I examine how the central role of the 
principle of non-interference sovereignty and how China applies this both when China 
perceive its sovereignty threatened and in its negotiations. Chapter 2 compares how 
China handles issues with transboundary resources, which they consider a sovereign 
matter, to other nations and finds that they use the principle of irredentism to lay claim 
over exclusive rights to these resources. Chapter 3 examines what implications China’s 




relationship between China’s foreign development aid to Africa and potential resources 
extraction and finds that because of their application of this principle, China feels 
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Setting the Stage 
Despite the fact that sovereignty is one of the central pillars of the international order, 
there are different and often conflicting ways in which it is viewed. This conflict stems 
from the redefinition that some nations have attempted to make to sovereignty in the 
post-World War II era. Many of nations in the developing world, including China, 
subscribe to the traditional view of sovereignty which imbues the state with absolute 
power over its people and the right to conduct its affairs in any way it sees fit. This view 
also designates the state as the highest form of governance and thus makes it subject only 
to the laws which it creates. This view has been challenged by the redefinition that some 
nations have attempted to put on sovereignty. These nations, many of whom are Western 
nations, believe that sovereignty is limited by international norms. They’ve sought to 
codify these norms through international organizations and treaties to limit sovereignty 
when it conflicts with such things as human rights.  
Because of its role as a leader among the developing nations, this has meant that China 
has become embroiled in many of the conflicts between these two views. The most 
visible of these conflicts is over shared resources, where China is embroiled in 
disagreements with a number of its neighbors. China’s view that sovereignty grants them 
unlimited rights to these resources conflicts with the international norm that countries 
should come to an agreement on the disposition of resources such as rivers, oil fields and 
fishing grounds to ensure each gets their fair share. Another area where conflict has 




development aid, it has brought them into conflict with Western aid programs, which 
place requirements on countries to liberalize their economy or to pass laws strengthening 
human rights. The Chinese, who do not place any requirements on their aid programs, 
view this as another example of Western interference. This has, however, lead many to 
believe that China’s aid is undermining Western programs and that it has an ulterior 
motive of targeting the resources of developing countries. The final area where these two 
views have come into conflict is international governance. As the number and size of 
international organizations has increased, their power has also increased. China, amongst 
other countries, view some of the trends originating from these organizations as threats to 
sovereignty and has vocally opposed such trends as humanitarian interventions, yet again 
claiming that they’re tools of Western imperialism. 
As China grows more powerful, both economically and politically, it will increase the 
chances of further disputes arising from topics related to sovereignty. If Western leaders 
can understand the historical context of China’s views and the manner in which they 
apply their views across a range of issue, it will allow them to anticipate China’s moves 
and work to accommodate them when possible or thwart them when necessary. 
Traditional Sovereignty 
Traditional sovereignty arose from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 in response to issues 
arising from the convoluted system of personal allegiances that had dominated feudal 




needed for growing worldwide trade.1 The new system was based on three requirements: 
territory, monopoly on authority, and recognition.  First, sovereignty was tied to 
geography and not personal allegiances.2 Sovereign nations are required to have a claim 
over territory in order to govern. By making this a requirement, nation-states broke the 
hold of the allegiance system as the basis for governance. The second principle of 
sovereignty is that the government has the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within 
its territory.3 Cohen agrees with this, stating that the sovereignty means that there is no 
internal authority that is equal to or autonomous of the state that is capable of claiming 
jurisdiction or political rule.4 Along with this monopoly on force, the government is 
granted the exclusive domain to govern its people as it sees fit and to exploit all resources 
contained within its territory.5 Once these are established, the third principle of 
recognition comes into play. Each sovereign entity must recognize other sovereign 
entities claim over their territory and their right to govern that territory in order to receive 
recognition in kind.6 By granting a state recognition, each state recognizes that state’s 
right to govern as they see fit and to abstain from interfering in their affairs.7  
Thus sovereignty imparted on nations the principle role in international relations. 
Because of the adherence to the principles, there would be no power whose rulings could 
                                                             
1 Cusimano, Maryann K. "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems." In Beyond 
Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, 1-40. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4 Cohen, Jean L. Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 
5 Cusimano, Maryann K. "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems." In Beyond 






stand above that of a sovereign state.8 This central role of states in the international 
system was reinforced first by the export of the principle to Asian countries such as 
China and Japan and subsequently with the granting of independence to Imperial colonies 
and former Soviet States.9 
Sovereignty Redefined 
Despite its central role in the international system, some academics and policymakers 
question the absolute nature of sovereignty.  Coleman cites that even the Western 
conception of sovereignty at its beginning was limited, with monarchs seeing themselves 
as answerable to God.10 As states became secular, theorists continued to perceive 
sovereignty as limited by developing international norms.11 These international norms 
have continued and in some cases have been codified in international law. One example 
of this is transboundary resources, these are resources that are shared by two or more 
nations and can include rivers, fishing grounds and oil. The distribution of these 
resources was originally handled when nations would strike a deal, sometimes referred to 
as a “sovereignty bargain.”12 This norm however, did not require states to share these 
resources. As a result, the United Nations worked to codify this norm by creating its 
                                                             
8 Cohen, Jean L. Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy and Constitutionalism. 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012 
9 Cusimano, Maryann K. "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems." In Beyond 
Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, 1-40. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000 
10 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013): 245. 
11 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013):245. 
12 Liftin, Karen T. "Constructing Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence." Constructing 




“equitable and reasonable use” policy.13 Another growing trend that has sought to limit 
sovereignty’s absolute nature is humanitarianism. Some have sought to limit sovereignty 
by defining the rights that a sovereign nation has to its citizens.14 By doing this, they hope 
to limit the absolute nature of a government’s control over its people in the sense that 
they would be required to protect their people from harm and could not subject them to it. 
One of the most outspoken defenders of this idea is Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who stated 
“Sovereignty is no longer absolute… Sovereignty must be kept in its place.”15 This norm, 
too, has received a codification by the United Nations in the concept of Responsibility to 
Protect. This concept provides the United Nations Security Council with the ability to 
take action in a country, regardless of their consent, to ensure the protection of the rights 
of its citizens. 
These international norms and laws have sought to limit two of the sovereignty’s major 
principles. They remove some of the absolute power that is granted to the internal affairs 
of a sovereign nation, as a well as define how they are to behave in regards to other 
nations. In addition, many of these laws are overseen by International Organizations, 
most notably the United Nations, which have no standing under traditional sovereignty. 
Because of this threat to sovereignty, some countries have worked to mitigate the power 
of these new laws or prevent their usage.  
                                                             
13 Wouters, Patricia. "The Yin and Yang of International Water Law: China's Transboundary Water 
Practice and the Changing Contours of State Sovereignty." Review of European, Comparative & 
International Environmental Law 23, no. 1 (April 2014): 69 
14 Cusimano, Maryann K. "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems." In Beyond 





China: Views on Sovereignty 
Sovereignty, in the Western sense, was a concept that was imported to China, as well as 
many other Asian countries.16 However, after adopting this concept from the West, China 
has become one of the greatest defenders of the traditional conception of sovereignty. 
Chinese leaders have even begun using it to combat the effects of globalization, though 
they have embraced globalization they have sought to control the socioeconomic effects 
domestically by using nationalism and sovereignty.17 They have worked to codify their 
views on sovereignty in their Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.18 These principle 
share many commonalities with those of Westphalian sovereignty. The principle require 
mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual 
non-interference in internal affairs, equality of benefit and peaceful coexistence.19  
There are two major historical factors that resulted in China adopting its current views on 
sovereignty in which the sovereign nation is not subject to higher power. The first was 
China’s unrivaled power in relation to its neighbors. Unlike the countries in Europe, 
China had no major rivals for its power in Asia, in many cases its neighbors such as 
Korea, Tibet and Vietnam were vassal states.20 As such, China never developed the 
concept of state-centric community because the centralized authority was never 
                                                             
16 Cusimano, Maryann K. "Beyond Sovereignty: The Rise of Transsovereign Problems." In Beyond 
Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda, 1-40. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2000 
17 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013): 240. 
18 Ibid: 240. 
19 Ibid: 240. 
20 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 




challenged, so there was no need to share power.21 In addition to their undisputed role as 
the regional power, China’s primary religions, Buddhism and Confucianism did not 
present challenges to the state’s power. Buddhism focused mainly on enlightenment and 
in the few instances where monasteries did pose a threat, they were quickly wiped out.22 
Confucianism went further by becoming one of the chief drivers China’s world view.23  
These historical factors set the stage for China’s current view on the role of sovereignty 
in the international system. As China has worked to integrate itself into the international 
system, it has continued to modify its views and present them to the world. This was seen 
most recently when China presented its “New Security Concept” which calls for 
cooperative means to deal with security issues without diluting the state-centric version 
of international relations.24 
Overview 
In this thesis I will examine how China applies its conception of sovereignty in its 
dealings with other nations and with international organizations and whether this leads to 
disputes with countries who do not share its view. To do this, I will look at three areas of 
application, how China responds to perceived threats to its sovereignty from other 
nations, how respect for sovereignty plays into their negotiations with other nations and 
                                                             
21 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013): 251. 
22 Ibid: 252. 
23 Ibid: 252. 
24 Yahuda, M. "The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power." In Power Shift: 





how China responds to international organizations when they develop policies that may 
infringe on sovereignty. 
Chapter 1 focuses on how China responds to international organizations when they 
pursue policies that could threaten sovereignty, particularly because of the requirement, 
based off of recognition, which prohibits interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign 
nation. Since of World War II and at an increasing rate since the fall of the Soviet Union, 
international organizations have been created. These organizations have been taking an 
increasingly large role in international governance and some of the policies put forward 
by these organizations are viewed by China and other countries as attempts to infringe on 
sovereignty. Given China’s prominent position in many of these organizations you would 
expect to see them work to counter these trends that it sees as a threat. To see if China is 
using their position in the United Nations and World Trade Organization to accomplish 
this aim, I will examine China’s reaction to three major policy trends, humanitarian 
intervention, trade regulation and the creation of international courts. Since all three of 
these trends can have some negative effect on China’s view of sovereignty, the 
expectation would be for China to oppose these trends. I will examine the manner in 
which China has responded in an attempt to determine if China is using their position to 
counter these trends. 
In Chapter 2, I will examine how the Chinese respond to perceived threats to their 
sovereignty by other nations. Specifically I will examine the territorial aspect of 
sovereignty and the inherent right of a nation to the resources within its territory. My 




they share resources and what role Chinese views on sovereignty plays in these disputes. 
These shared resources have become a major source of regional tension, despite the fact 
that most other nations that share resources have managed to come to an agreement that 
allows for a peaceful and somewhat equitable distribution. The resources I chose to 
investigate were shared rivers, fishing grounds, and oil. My investigation lead me to 
conduct a comparison between Chinese disputes with its neighbors and disputes between 
other nations over similar resources. Keeping in the mind the difference in power 
between China and many of its neighbors, I made sure that all of the comparison studies 
included a similar power dynamic to control for that issue. 
The last chapter examines how China applies its views on sovereignty in its negotiations 
with other nations. Based on the requirement of recognition, a state should not interfere in 
how another sovereign nation governs itself. With this in mind, I will focus on what 
China considers to be allowable behavior when it sticks to its views on sovereignty by 
looking at China’s development aid program in Africa. Their aid program has drawn 
accusations from other countries of being a mechanism for China to secure natural 
resources from developing nations, often at the detriment of that nation. This argument is 
countered by China by stating that Western aid programs are imperialistic because of 
their requirements liberalize trade, among other things, which Chinese aid doesn’t 
require. To test whether Chinese aid programs are being used to target resources I will 
examine their aid packages to five African nations. I will look for two major criteria, the 
first is whether or not the country is resource-rich and the second is if resources were 




Chapter 1: Measuring China’s Responses to International Organizations in regard 
to Sovereignty 
Introduction 
Beginning with the founding of the United Nations at the end of World War II, the 
number and size of international organizations has greatly increased. As this has 
occurred, more power has been invested in these organizations and they have begun 
taking on larger roles, in some cases these roles include overseeing the creation and 
maintenance of international laws and norms. This role as creators and maintainers has 
the potential to put these some of these organizations into conflict with countries who 
maintain a strict view on sovereignty, such as China. However, given China’s goal of 
normalizing its relations with other nations and taking a larger role in both the region and 
on the world stage, China has either sought membership in these organizations, such as 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or has worked to ensure their full participation in 
these organizations, as evidenced by their participation in the Security Council following 
the change in recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China 
in 1971.  
Because of their views on sovereignty, however, China has not always viewed the actions 
of these organizations in a positive light. Actions such as non-consensual humanitarian 
interventions have caused China to accuse these organizations of interfering in the affairs 
of nations, in violation of their sovereignty. As such, China has taken actions ranging 
from simply condemning these violations of sovereignty to actively using their position 




which was when they joined Russia and other countries in blocking a UNSC intervention 
in Syria.25 As China’s power increases, their power within these organizations will 
increase, which will give them greater ability to challenge and actions they view as a 
violation of sovereignty. Therefore it is necessary to examine their current interactions 
with international organizations and the norms and laws they have created to fully 
understand their views on sovereignty, particularly which of these norms they consider a 
threat, in order to predict where disputes may occur in the future.  
Literature Review 
The concept of sovereignty, as created by the Peace of Westphalia, has driven 
international relations since its inception. The concept is based on a monopolization of 
political authority and breaks down into three major principles: (1) equality in law, (2) 
non-aggression and respect for an entity’s territorial integrity, and (3) a right to non-
interference in a polity’s internal/domestic affairs.26 However, the Western conception of 
sovereignty has always been viewed as limited and has in recent years been redefined. 
Coleman illustrates this initial limitation on sovereignty by explaining how the actions of 
many Western sovereigns were limited by the perception that they were answerable to 
God and the church, though as time went on, theorists secularized these limitations by 
creating the concepts of international law.27 Over the course of the 1990s, however, many 
Western countries sought to create a new conception of sovereignty the no longer 
                                                             
25 Jafarova, Esmira. "Solving the Syrian Knot: Dynamics within the UN Security Council and Challenges to 
Its Effectiveness." Connections 13, no. 2 (Spring 2014): 44. 
26  Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013): 242. 




centered on the rights of sovereigns, but on their responsibilities. This reconceptualization 
resulted in a focus on the responsibility of governments to protect people and property 
and reoriented sovereignty to protect people as well as states, meaning non-intervention 
was no longer regarded as a sacrosanct principle.28 
Despite this reconceptualization of sovereignty by Western countries, China has sought to 
maintain its concept of sovereignty. As globalization has increased, Chinese leaders have 
embraced it, but sought to control the socioeconomic effects domestically by using 
nationalism and sovereignty.29 Their views on sovereignty are contained in their Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.30 These principle share many commonalities with 
those of Westphalian sovereignty. The principle require mutual respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal 
affairs, equality of benefit and peaceful coexistence.31 Unlike the Westphalian 
conception, though China’s concept of sovereignty is not subject to higher power. China 
never developed the concept of state-centric community because the centralized authority 
was never challenged, so there was no need to share power.32 The combination of the 
moral spiritual system present and a lack of countries who could be considered an equal 
led to an absolute view of sovereignty.33 The modern conception of this can be seen in 
China’s presentation of the “New Security Concept” which calls for cooperative means to 
                                                             
28 Chan, Lai-Ha, Pak K. Lee, and Gerald Chan. "Rethinking Global Governance: A China Model in the 
Making?" Contemporary Politics 14, no. 1 (2008): 4. 
29 Coleman, Andrew, and Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto. "“Westphalian” Meets “Eastphalian” Sovereignty: 
China in a Globalized World." Asian Journal of International Law 3, no. 02 (2013): 240. 
30 Ibid: 240. 
31 Ibid: 240. 
32 Ibid: 251. 




deal with security issues without diluting the state-centric version of international 
relations.34 As an example of this, we can look at China’s requirements for humanitarian 
interventions which state the intervention requires UN authorization, the invitation of the 
target state, and that it can only be pursued when all other means have failed.35  
The literature on Humanitarian Interventions would suggest that these actions, when non-
consensual, violate the principle of non-interference in the domestic and internal affairs 
of a nation that is inherent in Westphalian sovereignty. In looking at the UN charter, we 
see that it prohibits “Threat of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” and prevents the UN from intervening in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state.36 Based on this, it would seem that any intervention 
would qualify as a violation of sovereignty. However, Stefano points out that 
Humanitarian Interventions are based off of Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.37 He goes on to point out that there is now the view that violations of any 
of the rights and freedoms listed in Article 28 gives a moral authorization to a military 
intervention that is beyond the obligation not to interfere in the domestic affairs of 
states.38 This has led to a codification of instances when humanitarian intervention is 
permitted through the creation of the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). RtoP 
                                                             
34 Yahuda, M. "The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power." In Power Shift: 
China and Asia's New Dynamics, edited by David L. Shambaugh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005. 
35 Carlson, Allen. "Helping to Keep the Peace (Albeit Reluctantly): China’s Recent Stance on Sovereignty 
and Multilateral Intervention." Pacific Affairs 77, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 10. 
36 Stefano, Paul Di. "Human Rights Violations and the Moral Permissibility of Military 
Intervention." Peace Review 23, no. 4 (2011): 539. 
37 Ibid: 539. 




was proposed by the Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and states that 
“Sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable 
catastrophe- from mass murder and rape, from starvation- but that when they are 
unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community 
of states.39 Tiewa states that RtoP was designed as an attempt to create an obligation for 
countries to intervene to prevent massive human rights disasters even if they occur within 
a sovereign state.40 The nature of these required interventions can range from sanctions 
and prosecution to military intervention, however the later requires the approval of the 
UN Security Council.41 
Authors writing about the sovereignty implications of trade regulation focus mostly on 
the WTO and specifically on two aspects, Most Favored Nation Status and its court 
system. One of the primary goals of the WTO, and previously the General Agreement on 
Trade and Tariffs (GATT), is to counteract the tendency the tendency of larger countries 
to impose their view on weaker countries, this was done through the imposition of Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) status, which requires that all states be treated uniformly and 
removes the ability for countries to autonomously set their trade terms.42 Adoption of 
MFN signified a move away from conventional views on sovereignty because it removes 
the individual countries are no longer in full control of their trade policy.43 Despite the 
                                                             
39 Tiewa, Liu. "China and Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change of Its Policy for 
Intervention." The Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (2012): 154. 
40 Ibid: 155. 
41 Ibid: 155. 
42 Mahncke, Hans. "Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the 
WTO." Leiden Journal of International Law22, no. 2 (2009): 399-400. 




effects on sovereignty, there are two major benefits that authors such as Coglianese and 
Jackson point out. International organizations provide ‘co-ordination benefits’ which 
ensure that actions by each nation do not cause harm to other nations, or the system, by 
acting out of self-interest.44 They also prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ in which regulatory 
competition leads to a degradation of social and environmental standards.45 
In addition to MFN status, the WTO courts, designed to arbitrate disputes, have the 
potential to pose a threat to sovereignty. The courts, which were only meant to serve as an 
arbitrator of what measures are lawful, have begun making judgments on the desirability 
of certain measures.46 If this trend continues, Mahncke warns that the oversight of policy 
preferences by the court could lead to a loss of sovereignty by the nations in the WTO.47 
Despite these threats to sovereignty, there are many who believe that the WTO has 
actually strengthened the sovereignty of some countries and that its design prevents it 
from being a serious threat to sovereignty. Mahncke begins this argument by pointing out 
that members of the WTO are only bound by the rules to which they agree.48 This 
conditional nature of the rules has led Marchetti to characterize the WTO as a ‘debating 
club whose benefits should be seen as tangential to measures taken domestically.49 This 
                                                             
44 Coglianese, C. "Globalization and the Design of International Institutions." In Governance in a 
Globalizing World, by Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue. Cambridge, MA: Visions of Governance for 
the 21st Century, 2000. 
45 Jackson, J. "International Economic Law in times That Are Interesting."Journal of International 
Economic Law 3, no. 1 (2000): 3-14. 
46 Mahncke, Hans. "Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the 
WTO." Leiden Journal of International Law22, no. 2 (2009): 406. 
47 Ibid: 407. 
48 Mahncke, Hans. "Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the 
WTO." Leiden Journal of International Law22, no. 2 (2009): 404. 




lack of strength has led some to Howse to claim that the WTO has actually allowed 
countries to expand and project their sovereignty.50 An example put forward to support 
this is Panama, who used its accession to the WTO to combat vested interests and 
corruption.51 The court system, as with the WTO’s policies, also suffers from a degree of 
weakness that curbs its threat to sovereignty. Despite the fact that its rulings are meant to 
be binding to the parties involved, the courts do not possess the ability to enforce their 
rulings which has led some countries who disagree with the results to simply accept any 
sanctions that are placed on them for not abiding by the ruling.52 So, despite the threats 
that the WTO may pose to sovereignty, there seems to be a consensus that there are 
sufficient means to subvert these threats. 
Literature concerning the creation of international courts also suggests that they are 
perceived by many countries as an infringement on sovereignty. The primary event that 
led to creation of the international courts was the Nuremberg Trials. The effect that had 
on sovereignty can be seen in a quote by Melandri stating, “Absolute sovereignty was 
redimensioned in the aftermath of World War II with the development of the Nuremberg 
Charter.”53 This impact can be further seen when Broomhall discusses how Nuremberg 
created a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity and genocide on behalf of the 
                                                             
50 Mahncke, Hans. "Sovereignty and Developing Countries: Current Status and Future Prospects at the 
WTO." Leiden Journal of International Law22, no. 2 (2009): 401-402. 
51 Ibid: 402. 
52 Ibid: 407. 
53 Melandri, Manuela. "The Relationship between State Sovereignty and the Enforcement of International 
Criminal Law under the Rome Statute (1998): A Complex Interplay." International Criminal Law 




international community on the grounds of universal jurisdiction.54 The effect this has on 
the Westphalian notion of sovereignty can be seen in another quote by Broomhall, “The 
imposition of international criminal responsibility for core crimes committed by 
individuals in the name of the state gave rise to the principle that individuals have rights 
directly under international law and established the subordination of state sovereignty to 
the core values of the international community.55 We see support for this statement from 
Cryer and Soares. The former discusses how international criminal lawyers generally see 
state sovereignty as the enemy of international accountability and that it is a potential 
obstacle to achieving criminal justice.56 The latter puts forward the argument that, “All 
international bodies are restraints to the legal and even constitutional sovereignty of 
states.57 Discussion of the Rome Statute offers a further look into the effect the courts 
could have on sovereignty. The debate about the statute centered mainly on the 
constitutionalization of the transference of sovereignty.58 As a result, many viewed 
accession to the Rome Statute as a surrender of sovereignty.59 This has led to malaise and 
even hostility shown by the five permanent members of the Security Council which could 
serve as evidence that international criminal justice is a possible judicial counter-power 
and is viewed as an undesired conditioning on sovereignty.60 Despite this, there is 
                                                             
54 Broomhall, Bruce. International Criminal Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between 
Sovereignty and the Rule of Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003, 56. 
55 Ibid, 56. 
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discussion that the international courts are not threats to sovereignty. Melandri points out 
that the courts would only have jurisdiction in cases where a country failed to prosecute a 
case.61 Despite these views, Soares, himself, believes that it is not accurate to state that 
relations between sovereignty and international criminal justice are simply opposed and 
that there is no need to choose between sovereignty and international criminal justice.62 
Hypothesis 
Since the end of World War II and at an accelerating rate since the end of the Cold War, 
international governance has been expanding. As this has occurred, many countries, 
including China, have viewed these new trends in international governance, most notably 
humanitarian intervention, trade regulation and the creation of international courts, with 
suspicion due to the impacts they can have on their sovereignty. Despite this, China has 
increased its participation in international organizations including the United Nations and 
World Trade Organization (WTO), who are the creators and enforcers of these trends. 
This has led to the questioning of whether China's views on sovereignty have softened 
despite the limits they seek to place limits on countries' sovereignty. In spite of this, 
China continues to hold an absolute view on sovereignty, which has become known as 
the Eastphalian view, and has been working to assert its own views on sovereignty from 
within these organizations and counter the trends of international governance it believes 
infringe on sovereignty. 
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In order to determine if China is attempting to assert its own views on sovereignty on the 
rest of the World, I will examine China’s how has interacted with the UN and the WTO 
by how they have responded to three major trends in global governance brought about by 
these organizations: military interventions, trade regulation and the creation of 
international courts. Each of these trends has implications for sovereignty and could 
result in a loss sovereignty by countries over certain domestic issues as they are replaced 
by the rules of the international organizations created to oversee them. Given China’s 
economic power and its position on the UNSC, there are several option for China to resist 
infringements on sovereignty. The first would be for China to use its position as a major 
economic power to push back against these policies or to use its veto power to block 
these actions all together. The second reaction, in situations where China was not able to 
block the action, would be for them to refuse to accept the policy or judgment. After I 
have made the determinations on how China has responded to these trends and the effects 
they have had on sovereignty on sovereignty, I will look at all three trends together. If 
China has worked against two or all three of the organizations, I will accept my 
hypothesis that they are attempting to assert their own views on sovereignty. 
The first trend I will analyze is the increase in militarized humanitarian interventions. In 
order to test whether China is attempting to use its position on the Security Council to 
assert its views on sovereignty, I will look specifically at interventions directed by the 
Security Council where the country did not request the intervention or the intervention 




Libya and Syria because they all major post-Cold War interventions in which outside help 
was not requested or the UN exceeded the requested intervention by the parties involved. 
If China holds to its sovereignty policy in each case, I would expect to them to vote 
against these interventions. For each of the chosen interventions, I will examine China's 
behaviors, both the way they voted (for or against the resolution or whether they 
abstained) and their rhetoric. Cases in which China voted against resolutions where the 
subject country did not request the intervention will be regarded as evidence China is 
attempting to assert its views. For cases in which China abstained, I will subject the 
intervention to a further test in which I examine statements made by China regarding the 
intervention. Statements that argue against the intervention or that raise questions about 
sovereignty will be considered partial evidence for my claim and will be regarded as half 
of a vote against the resolution. I will then consider all of the interventions together and if 
the combined score is greater than 50% of what they would receive for always voting 
against the resolution, I will consider it evidence China is asserting its own views. 
To analyze China's views on trade regulation, I will look at two factors of China’s 
interaction with the WTO. The part of my investigation will be to look into how China 
responds to WTO policies that violate sovereignty. To do this, I will use the MFN policy 
and whether China has acquiesced to this policy or if they have attempted to subvert it. 
Any instance of China pursuing trade policies that run counter to MFN status will be 
considered evidence that they are attempting to assert their view. The second part of the 
assessment will look into the dispute resolution mechanisms within the WTO. China 




negotiations with other countries. If China were attempting to assert its view, you would 
expect them to refuse to bring cases to arbitration and that they would disregard 
judgments levied against them by the arbitrators. 
Lastly, I will examine how China has responded to the creation of international courts, 
specifically the ICC and ICJ. Similar to the arbitration mechanisms present in the WTO, 
if China viewed the ICC and ICJ as a violation of sovereignty, they would not bring cases 
before the court nor would they recognize the judgments of the court as valid. 
Furthermore, they would not send judges to sit on the court. To determine if China is 
attempting to assert its views on sovereignty, I will examine if China submits cases, 
whether or not they abide by rulings made and whether or not they have judges that sit on 
the court. These will be considered accepted if China refuses to submit cases, does not 
abide by the rulings of the court and refuses to send Chinese judges to sit on the court. 
For the overall judgment of the relationship, if two of three conditions are met, I will 
accept that hypothesis that China is attempting to assert its own views as proven. 
Data 
Humanitarian Interventions 
Possibly the most visible way in which international governance has increasing 
prevalence of military interventions into countries throughout the world since the end of 
the Cold War. Some of these instances are unilateral actions taken by a single country or 
organization, but most have occurred under the direction of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC). The reasons for these interventions have varied, but the majority of the 




the concept of Right to Protect (R2P) as justification. Though there have been instances 
where the parties involved have requested the outside assistance, many of the 
interventions have been conducted without seeking prior consent for either the 
intervention or the expansion of the external role. As such, China has viewed many of 
these interventions as threats to sovereignty. If they were in fact working to actively 
impose their own views on sovereignty, we should expect to see them using their veto 
power as a member of the UNSC to achieve this goal. 
The 1993 Civil War in Rwanda, between the Tutsis and the Hutus, offers the first 
opportunity to test for China’s views on sovereignty despite the general view that 
Rwanda was a failure to properly intervene in a humanitarian crisis. Due to consent given 
by both the Tutsis and the Hutus, China voted with the UNSC to create the UN 
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) which was charged with monitoring the 
ceasefire agreement between the two sides.63 China eventually withdrew its initial 
support. As the situation continued to deteriorate, the Security Council voted on a new 
resolution, UNSC Resolution 929. This new resolution authorized a “temporary operation 
under national command and authority aimed at contributing to peace and security… 
using all necessary means to achieve this humanitarian mandate.”64 China lodged to 
major objections to this new resolution. First, in abstaining from voting on the resolution, 
they stated that the UN had not garnered cooperation or consent from the two parties 
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involved.65 Their second complaint was that the UNAMIR’s mandate should remain 
limited to the monitoring of the peace treaty.66 This incident again showed that China 
sticks to its policies, at least in its rhetoric. While consent was present, they voted to 
conduct the intervention, but as the mission changed and consent was withdrawn China 
was willing to voice its differences with the other members of the UN over what it 
perceived as a violation of sovereignty, but was not willing to exercise its veto power. 
The 1999 intervention in Kosovo offers another opportunity to test whether China 
attempts to assert its own version of sovereignty. China opposed the US-led air campaign 
in Kosovo.67 IN this instance, they had only one major complaint, that the Kosovo issue 
was an internal affair and that there was no request by Yugoslavia for outside assistance. 
As a result the Chinese not only abstained from voting for UNSC Resolution 1160, but 
also criticized the six-power Contact Group (US, Britain, France, Italy, Germany and 
Russia) and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for their 
handling of the situation.68 Their position that this was an internal affair was summed up 
by statements made by Shen Guofang, Deputy Permanent Representative of China to the 
UN, saying “If the Council is to get involved in a dispute without the request of the 
country concerned, it may create a bad precedent and have wider implications,” and “We 
do not believe that the situation in Kosovo posed a threat to international peace and 
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security.”69 As with previous instances though, China did not exercise its veto ability and 
opted to simply take a rhetorical stand against the actions taken as a result of the 
resolution. 
The NATO-led intervention into Libya offers another test for China’s views of 
sovereignty. This intervention was the first instance of R2P being used as a justification 
for a humanitarian intervention and was expected to draw a veto from China.70 In the 
events leading up to the passage of UNSC Resolution 1973, China joined the rest of the 
Security Council in condemning the Gadhafi government’s actions and voted for 
Resolution 1970 which recalled the government’s responsibility to protect its people.71 
Despite this criticism of the government’s actions China had no desire to see a military 
intervention take place. In statements, China stressed that Libya’s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity should be respected and that the issue should be 
resolved by peaceful means.72 As a result, China joined several other nations in 
abstaining from voting on UNSC Resolution 1973.73 China’s choice not to exercise its 
veto power stemmed mainly from the requests made by the African Union and League of 
Arab Nations for UN involvement in Libya.74 However, as the role of the UN forces 
increased, China moved to openly criticizing NATO. They called for strict adherence to 
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the resolution, warning that this should not be used for an attempt at regime change, and 
criticized involvement in what they considered the internal affairs of a country.75 In this 
instance, China yet again refrained from using its veto power, however this was mostly 
due to the requests made by regional organizations. Once they nature of NATO’s 
intentions became clear, China quickly moved to condemn the actions taken and 
requested that the resolution be followed. 
In the wake of the Libya intervention, many countries wanted to take actions to intervene 
in Syria to deal with the humanitarian issues taking place. The Chinese joined the rest of 
the UNSC in condemning the humanitarian situation that was created by the Civil War, 
agreeing to a Presidential Statement, however were unwilling to approve any resolutions 
against Syria.76 Despite their unwillingness to approve a resolution, China did not block 
efforts to peacefully resolve the conflict. They agreed to both the creation of a Special 
Envoy to aid in mediating the conflict and approved of the Six-Point Plan that was 
devised and had been submitted to the Syrian government.77 As efforts continued, China 
agreed to UNSC Resolutions 2042 and 2043, which created an advance team and a full 
UN Mission respectively.78 However, as the situation continued to deteriorate, Chinese 
resistance, with the support of Russia, stiffened. China and Russia blocked two 
resolutions because they perceived them as attempts to institute a regime change, which 
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they felt could set a precedent.79 China’s opposition was summed up by Wang Yi, China’s 
Foreign Minister, when he stated, “External military intervention violates the purposes of 
the UN Charter and the basic norms of international relations and will add to the turmoil 
in the Middle East.”80 China’s actions in this instance lead many to believe their strict 
adherence to their principle of non-interference were prompted by the results of the 
intervention in Libya. As such, China stood firm to its views of sovereignty and exercised 
its veto power on multiple resolutions concerning Syria.  
In all the instances of humanitarian intervention examined, China refused to support the 
Security Council in passing the resolution. However, despite their disapproval, in all 
instances aside from Syria, they simply chose to abstain from voting instead of using 
their veto power. Despite this voting record, China registered vocal opposition to all of 
these interventions, leading me to accept my hypothesis that they are trying to assert their 
own view on sovereignty and not simply conforming to the current norms. 
Trade Regulation 
Global governance, in this case overseen by the WTO, has also been increasing in the 
domain of economics. The WTO, and its predecessor the GATT, was created to promote 
trade liberalization by setting rules for its members to follow, most notably the MFN 
clause, and by acting as an arbitrator in trade disputes amongst its members through the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Despite the voluntary nature of the rules of the WTO, 
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these two functions do have the potential to infringe on a nations sovereignty by 
removing their ability to fully control their trade policy, removing their ability to 
negotiate differences and by imposing penalties on a country for its trade policies. 
Though subverting these rules has become commonplace among many of the members, 
you would expect to see China joining this trend to challenge anything that it saw as a 
threat to its sovereignty. 
China, like many other nations, has sought to undermine the MFN clause of the WTO. 
The primary means they have chosen to accomplish this is by creating bilateral and 
multilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA). These agreements, which are allowed under 
the WTO, violate the principle of MFN because the participant countries are not 
requirement to extend the same benefits given to the members of the FTA to other 
nations.81 As of Early 2012, China had already signed 10 bilateral and multilateral FTAs 
with multiple countries and organizations (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, ASEAN10, 
Pakistan, Singapore, Peru, and Colombia).82 In addition to these, they were also working 
on agreements with Australia, Iceland, South Korea, Norway, Switzerland, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council and Southern African Customs Union.83 
The DSB was designed to make rulings on disputes between WTO members when 
bilateral negotiations had failed84. Despite the threats that the DSB poses to sovereignty, 
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China’s track record has shown compliance with rulings against it and a willingness to 
bring disputes against other nations. Initial fears were that China would act as a 
disruptive force within the DSB and would use it to pursue their own interests, similar to 
how they have upon joining other international organizations.85 Instead, China has 
become active in the dispute resolution process. They rank among the Top 3 parties 
involved in the dispute settlement process, acting as a complainant in addition to a 
respondent.86 The fact that China has taken the role of a complainant is telling in that it 
shows China is not passively using the system but seeks to be an active member of the 
process, despite the fact that it can call for outside impositions to be made on a country’s 
laws. China has additionally showed great respect for the authority of the DSB, even in 
instances where it faced adverse rulings or in which the DSB did not stick to the text of 
the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).8788 Even though China has shown a 
willingness to use the DSB and adhere to its rulings, there are instances where bilateral 
negotiations are a more effective means of seeking a resolution. In the case of China, this 
is the case when politically sensitive issues are involved.89 An example of this is the case 
of China-Publications and Audiovisual Products where a Chinese State-Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) was involved selling cultural products and enjoyed privileges under China’s 
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policies.90 Because of the level of power these SOEs held, they were able to influence the 
government and have caused the implementation of the ruling by the DSB to be 
delayed.91 Overall China has shown a desire to comply with DSB rulings, which can be 
seen in Webster’s study which found China to be compliant in both a timely manner and 
qualitative manner in 5 of 8 cases examined.92 The future of compliance, however is less 
certain particularly as China becomes more powerful. China has failed to fully comply 
with the some of the recent rulings by annulling all regulations as pledged or 
implementing the ruling in a non-compliant manner.93 The chief violations that China has 
committed in this realm are their continued implementation of policies that violate the 
prescription on low tariffs, fail to minimize export restrictions, fail to give equal 
treatment to foreign investment and fail to offer strong intellectual property rights.94 
However, China’s violation of these rulings may simply show that they have learned that 
complete compliance is not something that is always observed by the great trading 
powers.95 
China’s interactions with the WTO seem to generally fall in line with the actions of the 
rest of the member nations, particularly those of the greater powers. China has shown a 
general willingness to accept both the policies put forward the any rulings made 
regarding them. There are certain caveats to this which mostly involve SOEs. Overall, 
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however, China has not shown tendencies to fight any of these breaches or potential 
breaches of sovereignty. 
International Courts 
There are two major international courts have been set up, the first was the International 
Court of Justice, which was established through the United Nations, and the second was 
the International Criminal Court, which was established after the signing of the Rome 
Statue.9697 Though each court has its own jurisdiction, they share a common trait in that 
they both require a country to grant its consent in order for the court to have jurisdiction 
over them, in the case of the ICJ, or their citizens, in the case of the ICC.9899 The creation 
of these courts have caused a large amount of debate over what effect they will have on 
sovereignty. 
The ICJ was created to serve as the chief legal body of the UN with the power to deal 
with legal issues referred to it by the states and to provide the General Assembly with 
guidance on legal issues.100 As previously mentioned, though, the court’s jurisdiction only 
extends to those countries who accept it. Though is not the only nation that refuses to 
recognize this jurisdiction, China has chosen not joined many other Asian nations in its 
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refusal to recognize this jurisdiction.101 The political nature of these cases makes it 
unlikely that China will move to recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction, particularly in regards 
to the South China Sea, and that they, like other Asian nations will pursue bilateral 
negotiations as a means to solving disputes.102 
China’s relationship with the ICC is more complex. The ICC was created as an 
independent international organization103 with the signing and ratification of the Rome 
Statute by 60 nations.104 Its purpose is to prosecute crimes of importance to the 
international community as a whole, namely war crimes, genocide, crimes against 
humanity and crimes of aggression.105 As with the ICJ, China does not recognize the 
jurisdiction of the ICC, and is currently a non-State Party.106 However, China has both 
voiced its support for the creation of the court and was an active participant in the 
negotiations that produced the Rome Statute, despite its casting of a negative vote in the 
end.107 There are a few issues that China has with the ICC that caused its negative vote. 
The first major issue was the issue of jurisdiction, which China believed should be on an 
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opt-in basis for the crimes that could fall under the ICC’s purview.108 Their desire for an 
opt in nature of the court displays similar tendencies to their policy on humanitarian 
intervention, showing a consistency that external organizations should only intervene in a 
country’s affairs if they are invited. They also held reservations over the definitions put 
forward for war crimes and crimes against humanity, which they cited had no current 
international convention.109 China’s final objection came with the failure of the 
negotiators to come to an agreement on a definition of the crime of aggression, its 
inclusion left too much uncertainty for China to be able to accept the Rome Statute.110 
Despite this, China has maintained contact with the court, closely following its 
negotiations over the definition of the crimes of aggression, and has participated in 
several working groups.111 China’s dealings with the court have upheld their commitment 
to maintaining their own views on sovereignty, but have also demonstrated a desire to 
work constructively with the ICC to ensure they protect the sovereign rights of nations. 
China’s behavior toward the international courts displays their desire to defend their own 
sovereignty. Overall, they are not attempting to disrupt the formation of the courts, China 
has simply worked to remove itself from their jurisdiction when possible. In the case of 
the ICC, they have been working to influence the court and assert their view of optional 
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jurisdiction, thus allowing them to defend their sovereignty, though not in a destructive 
manner. 
Conclusion 
Overall, China’s actions toward international organizations offers weak support a claim 
that they are actively trying to assert their views on sovereignty on these organizations. 
Across all three international norms that were examined in this paper China displayed a 
definite desire to protect their view on sovereignty, but did not display a consistent 
tendency to actively assert their view or to thwart these trends. For the purpose of the test, 
they scored just over half the points available for humanitarian interventions and half for 
both trade regulation and establishment of international courts. This leaves two possible 
explanations, which further study could seek to better elucidate. The first is that China is 
approaching these organizations, and the trends they create, from a realist perspective and 
that they see more benefit to themselves in conforming to these trends than they do to 
seeking to thwart them. The second possible explanation is that China, which is still a 
developing nation, has not accrued what they consider to be enough power, relative to the 
West, to be able to successfully challenge these norms. As such, conducting these tests 
again, at a later date, would allow for a determination of which of these hypotheses is 
true. So long as China maintains their views on sovereignty, similar results to these tests 
would suggest that China is employing a realist perspective while active attempts by 
China to assert their views would support the hypothesis that China was simply waiting 
for the relative difference in power between themselves and the West to narrow before 




Chapter 2: The Effect of Chinese Views on Sovereignty on Resource Disputes 
Introduction 
Despite the initial predictions that limited, shared resources would become a source of 
conflict, we have seen the opposite. Nations across the world are working together and 
putting aside their differences in order to engage in joint exploitation of resources ranging 
from water to oil. This even the case when there is a large disparity in power between the 
two nations that would be competing for the resources. 
There is, however, one exception to this this trend of cooperation in the exploitation of 
resources where both countries have a valid claim, China. Despite China's claims of 
being neighborly and their entry into several treaties and organizations regarding 
resources, China has adopted a policy of pursuing their own resource goals with little to 
no regard for the rights of other countries and with policies that fly in the face of the 
requirements of equitable and reasonable use that we see present in modern day 
international law and often violates the treaties they've signed or the regulations placed 
on them by entry into different organizations. These policies are not relegated to a single 
resource, such as oil which is considered to be of great strategic value, but spans nearly 
any potential transboundary resource. This is seen in such examples are their creation of 
massive dams on rivers originating in Tibet, their attempts to exclude other South East 
Asian nations from fishing in the South China Sea, and the recent clash between China 
and Vietnam over the deployment of the oil rig Shiyou 981.112 This unilateral move, 
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which ran contrary to their previous agreement to jointly develop the oil believed to be in 
the area, lead to Chinese and Vietnamese ships ramming each other and greatly increased 
tensions in the region.113 These policies have already destabilized the region and have the 
potential to be an increasing source of tension between China and its neighbors in the 
future. 
Because of the increasing role that China is playing both in the region and on the world 
stage, it is necessary to understand the views that are driving their foreign policy, 
particularly when they are a source of tension. Chief among these, in regards to conflicts 
caused by resources, is their strict, and outdated view on sovereignty and what rights that 
gives them in regards to resources. In order to accomplish this, I will be looking at how 
China's view on sovereignty differs from the current interpretation of  sovereignty seen in 
international law and how this brings them into conflict with other nations at a time when 
shared resources have generally brought nations closer together. 
Literature Review 
To determine whether China's views on territory are causing the disputes that are 
occurring between it and its neighbors, two factors must be examined. First it will be 
necessary to examine what role resources play in disputes between countries. The next 
step will be to establish whether China has a view on resource and territorial rights that 
differs from other countries. 
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Many authors have sought to determine the role that resources play in interstate conflict. 
This has led to three different views on how resources can either lead to conflict, or 
conversely, to cooperation. The first view takes a realist approach to resources. They state 
that resources, in particular ones that are scare or valuable, will act as a source of conflict. 
The second view is that, though resources may play into the reasons for a conflict, other 
forces, in particular political and economic forces must be present in order for resource 
disputes to cause a conflict. The final group, by contrast, believes that shared resources 
tend to lead to cooperation among the nations that share them. 
The view that resources act as a source of conflict is often referred to as the neo-
Malthusian point of view. Scholars who subscribe to this view posit that the increasing 
demand for resources will lead to increased instances of resource scarcity, which will in 
turn lead to conflict. Dinar outlines this thinking when he discusses how a number of 
factors including climate change and population growth will lead states to take Hobbesian 
actions in order to compete for the limited resources available to them.114 He goes on to 
discuss how this view is supported by Choucri and North's Lateral pressure theory, in 
which they state that, “Rivalry and Conflict in the international system is partly guided by 
domestic growth and expansion and subsequent competition for resources and 
markets.”115 This is supported by Starr, who discusses how increases in population and 
industrialization can lead a country to outstrip its resources and will thus potentially lead 
to violent conflict in order to continue its growth. Sharp further supports this point of 
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view by discussing the issues that are taking place in the Caspian Sea basin and how the 
struggle for these resources has resulted in increased military presence or involvement 
from China, Russia and the United States.116 Even though this may not lead to a conflict 
between the major powers, there is still a chance that the desire to exploit the oil in the 
area could lead to conflicts among the smaller regional states. 
The neo-Malthusian theory incorporates both renewable and non-renewable resources as 
potential sources for conflict. Chief among the resources that are believed to be potential 
causes for conflict are fresh water and fisheries, in the renewable realm, and oil, in the 
non-renewable realm. There seems to be a consensus among practitioners of this theory 
that water is the most likely of these resources to act as a source of conflict. Homer-
Dixon lays out how conflict could arise between and upstream and downstream state over 
water, citing that water is a resource that is essential to national survival. The other 
resource scholars believe has the potential to drive conflict is oil. Again, Homer-Dixon 
points to the fact that oil is a major driver of military power.117 Klare goes on to say that 
oil could act as a “casus belli” for countries in the Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea or South 
China Sea.118 
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The remaining views, though somewhat different, belong to a group called the “Resource 
Optimists” or “Cornucopians.”119 These scholars take the view that resources will not be 
the single, driving factor in conflicts, if they lead to conflict at all. Lomborg posits that 
these scarcities will result in adaptations to the economy, via technology or of social 
institutions, or a combination of these methods, to compensate for the scarcity.120 
A somewhat less straight-forward view of the relationship between resources and conflict 
is that they are only a contributing factor to a conflict. This view, outlined by Koubi et al, 
states that resources are only a part of the cause for any war and the political and other 
factors need to be present in order for a conflict to result.121 
The other view espoused by the Resource Optimists is that scare resources are more 
likely to result in cooperation between the nations that share these resources. Rawls 
conjectures that this presence of a scarcity will cause the parties involved the impetus 
necessary to come to an agreement.122 This is supplemented by Dolšak and Ostom, who 
add to this that the resource must not be degraded to the point where it is no longer usable 
and that there must be advantages that result from organizing to ensure its distribution.123 
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The initial view on this subject was that resources would become a major driver of 
interstate conflict. However, a growing body of research suggests that resource scarcity 
can act as a driver toward cooperation rather than conflict. At most, scholars view the 
role of resources in conflicts as a secondary issue that is part of number of grievances 
between the parties involved. 
To examine the second part of my hypothesis, it is necessary to look at the current state 
of sovereignty and resource rights in international law. Literature on this subject, and 
across all resources it might touch, suggest that there is a balance that has been struck 
between the sovereign rights of states over the resources contained within their territory 
and the responsibility to any other states with whom they share these resources, to 
practice equitable and reasonable use. 
According to Hochstetler et al and Keohane, original views on sovereignty conveyed on 
nation-states internal supremacy and the ability to act independently of external 
pressures, thus being free of external influences is viewed as the ideal situation.124125 This 
view is often characterized as absolutist.126 However, Litftin shows that because of the 
complexity of environmental issues that states will often enter into a “sovereignty 
bargain” where they give up some autonomy in order to receive a benefit of some kind.127  
                                                             
124 Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Anne Marie Clark. "Sovereignty in the Balance: Claims and Bargains at the 
UN Conferences on the Environment, Human Rights, and Women." International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 
4 (December 2000): 591-592 
125 Keohane, Robert O. "Ironies of Sovereignty: The European Union and the United States." Journal of 
Common Market Studies 40, no. 4 (November 2002): 744 
126 Saul, Ben. "China, Natural Resources, Sovereignty and International Law." Asian Studies Review 37, no. 
2 (2013): 197-196 
127 Liftin, Karen T. "Constructing Environmental Security and Ecological Interdependence." Constructing 




This absolutist view, however, has changed in light of the realization that environmental 
and resource issues do not fit neatly into territorial boundaries, and that the actions of one 
nation may have negative repercussions on other nations access to and ability to exploit 
their resources. The United Nations has worked to codify this new view that is centered 
on the principle of “equitable and reasonable use,” which is mentioned by Wouters and 
Berardo and Gerlack.128129 This new vision of sovereignty is designed to urge cooperation 
amongst states in extracting resources.130 
In the literature for both conflict and sovereignty is plainly clear that there has been a 
great shift. For resource conflict, the cornucopian view is generally poorly outlined and 
mostly just stated that they view human adaptability as the necessary solution to resource 
driven conflicts. Though they do believe that other factors tend to be the drivers, they do 
not mention how these factors, in combination with a resource issue could lead to 
conflict. In sovereignty literature, there has been a major shift from the absolutist view to 
one of cooperation, particularly when it comes to resources. It could be beneficial to do 
some sort of comparison between the two to fully delineate their differences and any 
similarities that they share. 
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Despite a growing body of research that suggests that shared resources lead to 
cooperation among states, China has been engaged in an increasing number of disputes 
over shared resources, such as rivers, oil and fishing grounds. In many instances they 
refuse to negotiate with the other nations and in the instances where they have made 
agreements to conduct joint exploitation with other countries, they often violate these 
agreements. A key driver of these disputes is China's policy of irredentism and its strict 
views on territorial rights, which run in contrast to current customary international law, 
and serve as the cause for these disputes because it prevents other countries from being 
able to negotiate with China for their fair share of the shared resources. 
Methodology 
To examine this claim, that it is China's very strict view on sovereignty that is driving 
these resource disputes, I will examine other instances where countries have had 
competing claims over shared resources. I will be specifically focusing on river systems, 
oil and fishing grounds. These three groups of resources all have bodies of study that 
have been devoted to them, particularly looking at whether or not they contributed to 
conflict. As part of my selection of case studies, I have accounted for the fact that there 
is, in most cases, a very large disparity in power between China and the other countries 
involved in the resource disputes. As a result, I have sought to find case studies where 
one of the countries involved was considerably more powerful than the other country or 
countries. This lead me to include the disputes over oil in the Gulf of Mexico and North 




Mexico and the United States in my case studies. The inclusion of these studies should 
help to control against the results being biased due to the disparity in power between 
China and its neighbors. 
I will be conducting a direct comparison between each of the case studies, all of which 
involve a resource dispute and then examining their end or current state. Disputes will be 
considered successfully resolved if there is a treaty or organization that was put into place 
to govern access to the shared resource that is recognized by all parties as legitimate and 
in which none of the parties involved commits significant violations. The treaty or 
governing body does not have to ensure completely equitable access to the resource to be 
considered successful.  
If my hypothesis is true, I would expect to see that the other case studies, in which the 
countries subscribe to the principle of equitable and reasonable usage, will result in a 
successful resolution to the resource dispute. However, the cases involving China should 
show that the Chinese, because of their strict view on sovereignty and use or irredentism, 
will either refuse to negotiate over the resources and claim them all for themselves or 
violate agreements that they have made. 
Data 
Oil in the North Sea 
One example of a shared resources leading to cooperation is the 1979 treaty between 
Norway and the United Kingdom for the development of the Frigg Gas Field. This is 
despite the fact that the United Kingdom has had several years over the life of the treaty 




barrels per day (bpd) more than it was producing.131 The field lies on both sides of the 
maritime territorial divide between the two countries. This reservoir was equally capable 
of being exploited from both sides of the boundary. As a result, the governments of the 
two countries came together and generated a plan to jointly exploit the gas field and to 
divide the proceeds. Their agreement allowed for the joint exploitation of the field via 
unitization, which is a system in which a transboundary gas field is exploited as a single 
unit and the two governments create a host facility based on their respective laws.132 
Their development plan resulted in a system where both countries were able to safeguard 
sovereignty and that required both countries to approve the development plans.133 
The agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway, beyond showing that oil can 
be jointly exploited without drawing the nations into a conflict, has acted as a model to 
the rest of the world. Counties in the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere have 
taken lessons from this agreement and modeled their own joint exploitation efforts after 
it. 
Oil in the Gulf of Mexico 
As with the case of the North Sea, the United States and Mexico and Mexico share some 
significant oil and natural gas fields in the Gulf of Mexico that could serve as a major 
point of tension between the two nations. This could be exacerbated by the fact that the 
United States, who is clearly the more powerful nation has been seeking to become more 
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energy independent by pursing domestic oil and natural gas production. However, as with 
the case of the North Sea, the United States and Mexico have come to an agreement 
which allows both countries to exploit their fair share of the hydrocarbon resources 
contained in the Gulf. 
The agreement between the United States and Mexico is based on two treaties. The first 
of these treaties was the Treaty on Maritime Boundaries, which though it was concluded 
in 1978, was not ratified by the United States until 1997, mostly due to the fact that the 
treaty did not include delimitation of transboundary reservoirs.134 There was another 
major issue that was also left open by this treaty, a gap between the negotiated territorial 
claims that was termed the Western Gap.135 This lead to the negotiation of a second treaty 
between the United States and Mexico, called the Treaty Between the Government of the 
United States and the Government of the United Mexican States on Delimitation on the 
Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of Mexico Beyond 200 Nautical Miles, this treaty 
set the boundaries of the Western Gap that included clauses to deal with the exploitation 
of transboundary reserves.136 The framework created by the United States and Mexico, 
particularly the Treaty on Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Western Gulf of 
Mexico, has been viewed as mutually beneficial to both countries.137 Despite the fact that 
some contend that the use of unitization would allow for more efficient and complete 
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exploitation of these resources,138 the treaty allows for the both sides to exploit their 
portion of the resources and to act as starting point from which to negotiate further 
treaties between the two countries over transboundary reserves in the Gulf of Mexico and 
the Pacific Ocean.139 
United States and Canadian Fishing Agreement in the Gulf of Maine 
In the 1970s, the United States and Canada extended their jurisdictions to include all 
waters within 200 nautical miles of their respective coasts, thus bringing the Gulf of 
Maine into their exclusive domain.140 This proved to be an ineffective arrangement 
particularly because of the overlapping claims of the two countries in the Eastern 
George's Bank.141 This lead to the United States and Canada developing a number of 
cooperative initiatives seeking to address the transboundary issues the two countries were 
facing, resulting in the creation of Canada-US Steering Committee.142 Through its 
various committees, this the Canada-US Steering Committee assess fish stocks within the 
Gulf of Maine and supervises transboundary initiatives.143 
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Despite the fact that the Canada-US Steering Committee was only an advisory committee 
and could provide non-binding advice, the committee was able to devise the formula that 
would be used to allocate the different fish stocks between the United States and 
Canada.144145 The United States and Canada also faced another major issue in their 
agreements over the Gulf of Maine was illegal fishing, mostly from American fishing 
vessels violating Canadian waters.146 This prompted a further agreement between the 
United States and Canada to standardize their penalties for violating the fishing 
agreement.147 In looking at these agreements, it is clear that the United States and Canada 
are working together to ensure that each country receives its fair share of the fish stocks 
in the Gulf of Maine.  
United States and Mexican River Arrangements 
The United States and Mexico share two major Rivers, the Colorado and the Rio Grande 
Rivers. Both of these rivers have their primary headwaters in the United States, however 
the Rio Grande has several major tributaries that feed it from the Mexican side of the 
border.148 These rivers are administered by the International Boundary and Water 
Commission (IWBC), whose job is to ensure that obligations are being met by countries 
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in terms of the amount and quality of water they are supplying to the rivers and to 
arbitrate any disputes that may arise over the rivers.149 
The IWBC has managed these river systems effectively, ensuring both the quantity and 
quality requirements have been met. A primary example of the IWBC in action was their 
arbitration of a water quality complaint filed by Mexico in regards to the Colorado River 
in 1960s.150 The water being delivered to Mexico by the United States was too salty and 
was thus disrupting Mexican agriculture and their ability to distribute freshwater to their 
citizens.151 The IWBC arbitrated the situation, and over the course of a number of years 
got the two countries to agree to a series of drainage ditches to lower the salinity and 
funding to repair the damage done by salty water.152 The IWBC has also been working to 
address the drought conditions that are being faced by the Rio Grande by using its 
technical and diplomatic expertise to act as an arbitrator between the U.S. Department of 
State and the Mexican Foreign Ministry. Its effectiveness can also be seen in the fact that 
they were able to conclude negotiations on Minute 319, which is many people view as 
setting a precedent for the allocation of resources for environmental concerns.153 This 
ability successfully arbitrate disputes shows a strong structure and commitment by both 
sides to ensure peaceful and equitable use of their shared freshwater resources. 
Chinese Views on Territory 
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When looking at the literature in this area we find that there are two major views on how 
China's interactions with its neighbors. The first is that China has worked to become a 
more integral part of the international community and that they are working to conduct 
multilateral negotiations with its neighbors over conflicts and abides by these rulings 
based on their understanding the of International Law. The other view is that China has 
an absolutist view of sovereignty, which results in their aggressive territorial claims and 
their refusal to recognize any claims to resources they believe to be their own, though 
even when it pursues this absolutist position we have seen instance in which China was 
willing to make concessions. 
Since the 1970s, China has been working to integrate itself into the international system. 
At that time it assumed its seat on the United Nations Security Council and has since 
been integrating itself into the international system. Much of their initial hesitation, 
according to Saul, was based on the historical application of International Law that had 
been applied to them by the European colonial powers in which power was rewarded.154 
This application, he continues, has helped shape the Chinese view on International Law, 
particularly their views on sovereignty and historical claims. However, this view 
subscribes to the fact that the Chinese are pursuing this further integration and cites its 
membership in international organizations and the treaties and trade agreements to which 
it is a party as a sign that they are simply pursuing normal international norms. 
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The second point of the view is that China is that they are pursuing a very strict 
interpretation of International Law and that they are standing on loose historical claims to 
back up their strict version of sovereignty. Buhi brings this out particularly by explaining 
China's use or irredentism in its Constitution. In doing this, they are bringing issues that 
should be foreign policy, such as the status of resources in the South China Sea, into the 
domestic realm based on their historical claim and their policy of reunification of all 
Chinese lands.155 However, Fravel points out that China’s position is not always about 
meeting challenges head on. Even when they are confronted with a challenge to their 
territorial position, regime security takes precedence over territory, their actions in the 
wake of events such as the invasion of Tibet, the Great Leap Forward, Tiananmen Square 
and violence against the separatists in Xinjiang demonstrate this commitment.156 Fravel 
also points out that China is employing a long-term strategy, particularly in the South 
China Sea, in which it is attempting to ensure that other countries are unable to 
consolidate any claims they made while China works to consolidate theirs.157 The view 
that China is pursuing this strict interpretation of sovereignty is further seen when Saul 
mentions that China is not a part of the Mekong River Commission. This has allowed 
China to pursue exploitation of the river without regard for the downstream states. 
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Furthermore, when challenged on the issue, Chinese officials states that the manner in 
which they exploit their water resources is a matter of sovereignty.  
Chinese Oil Disputes in the South China Sea 
One more high visibility disputes that China has been having is over the oil and natural 
gas fields in the South China Sea. There is no current governing body and though there 
have been talks about joint development of the oil and gas fields between China and the 
other nations in the region, there has been little to no action in the area. This lack of 
action may in part be due to the fact that, other than China, the other countries in the 
region lack the necessary technology to conduct deep water drilling necessary to exploit 
these resources. 
China has made offers in the past to begin conducting joint exploitation of the oil and 
natural resources in the South China Sea, however there was no time frame given, and 
given the fact that there seems to be no effort on China's part to conduct this joint 
exploitation, it has come to be viewed as diplomatic deception.158 China's offers for joint 
development have often involved efforts to reinforce their own sovereignty. Often, their 
view of joint development involves development of resources that are on the continental 
shelf of the other nation, but only after they have recognized China's sovereignty over the 
area, thus reinforcing their territorial claims.159 China has also used threats to undermine 
the ability of the other countries, particularly Vietnam, to conduct partnering operations 
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with foreign companies, thus leaving them as the only alternative, which would require a 
statement that would reinforce their territorial claims.160 This aggressive stance that 
China has taken, using their historical claims and making requirements that other 
countries acknowledge their sovereignty as part of entering into a joint development 
agreement, seeks to deny the other countries in the South China Sea the ability to exploit 
the oil and natural gas fields that are present there, while enabling China to conduct 
unilateral development. 
Chinese Oil Disputes in the East China Sea 
Along with South China Sea, one of China's more visible disputes is with Japan in the 
East China Sea. Much of this dispute is centered around the competing claims the two 
countries have on the Senkaku/Diaoyutai Islands. However, in recent years the two 
countries have come into conflict over the rights to exploit the oil fields in the East China 
Sea. Part of this conflict stems from the differing methods used by each country to 
determine the extent of their Exclusive Economic Zone. Japan uses the Median Line 
while China claims the natural prolongation of its land territory.161 Joint development of 
the gas fields in this area began in 2004 after Japan filed a claim against Chinese drilling 
in the Chunxiao gas fields, citing that the drilling could extract hydrocarbon resources 
from the Japanese side of the Exclusive Economic Zone.162 After a period of heightened 
tensions, which included a deployment of Chinese warships to the area in the wake of the 
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Japanese government granting a drilling permit near the oil field, the two sides came to 
an agreement called the “Principled Consensus on the East China Sea Issue.”163 The 
“Consensus” involves a three part process that begins with the two sides agreeing to a 
joint development project and then takes them through the joint development of a field 
near the Longjing Field and concludes with China allowing Japanese participation in the 
development on the Chunxioa gas field.164 
This agreement has been plagued by issues and much of the follow-on negotiations need 
to take place have not. The first of these issues was the arrest of a Chinese trawler captain 
who collided with a Japanese patrol boat off of the Senkaku Islands, this served to 
increase tensions between the two countries.165 The next source of tension came when 
China began exploitation of the Tianwaitian field, despite Japanese objections which 
stated that the “Consensus” had called for a halt to all unilateral development.166 There 
also been a disagreement between the two countries on Part III of the consensus, in which 
China views the joint development of the Chinxioa field as an opportunity for Japanese 
companies to invest in the development of the field, not actually participate. A key reason 
behind China's reasoning was their continued claim of sovereignty over the East China 
Sea.167 
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Unlike some of China's other resources disputes, there dealings with the Japanese are less 
one-sided. However, they still use their claims of sovereignty in an attempt to unilaterally 
exploit the resources, despite agreements for joint exploitation. 
Chinese Fishing Disputes in the South China Sea 
As with their conflicts over oil in the South China Sea, China's disputes with the 
countries of the ASEAN over fishing are based primarily on their claim of the entirety of 
the South China Sea based on historic claim.  
In this case, China's primary goal is to enforce its fishing laws throughout the South 
China Sea. This is done primarily through Hainan's legislature which is responsible for 
administering two-thirds of China's maritime territory. The territory over which Hainan 
has jurisdiction has been kept intentionally vague, but maps show their boundaries 
intersecting the 9-Dash-Line, thus leading people to believe that this jurisdiction extends 
over the entire South China Sea.168 A major way that China enforces its will on the South 
China Sea is their annual fishing ban in certain areas. They have also worked to create a 
civilian law enforcement presence in the area to enforce these laws, though this is backed 
by the People Liberation Army Navy, to ensure that countries attempting to violate the 
laws can not resort to escalation.169 The creation of this law enforcement capability has 
resulted in the arrest of fishers from ASEAN nations and the confiscation of equipment. 
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In order to try to curb China's aggressive behavior and promote security in the South 
China Sea, the ASEAN and China signed the Declaration on the Code of Conduct of the 
Parties in the South China Sea in 2002.170 However, calls by ASEAN nations for 
responses to aggressive Chinese actions have not been successful in getting a response 
from China.171 
Despite their entry into an international agreement, China's dealings in regards to fishing 
in the South China Sea show their policy of irredentism. They are backing their historical 
claim with law enforcement efforts in an attempt to keep this out of the foreign policy 
realm and to deal with this as a domestic issue. This shows that they intend to keep full 
sovereign control over these resources and are unlikely to take part in efforts to jointly 
exploit the fisheries. 
Mekong River Dispute 
The Mekong River has its headwaters in China and crosses through five other countries 
(Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam. Of these four countries, four have 
entered into Mekong River Commission, a loose, consultative body designed to bring 
these nations together in their plans for the river.172 However, this institution is 
considered to be weak for two primary reasons, one is that the institution has no power to 
prevent states from acting in a unilateral manner and the second being that not all of the 
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riparian states are members, this includes China, the most powerful of the nations and the 
nation that contains the headwaters.173 Because China is not a member, they have only 
agreed to provide hydrological data to the members of the Mekong River Commission.174 
Much as with the other instances of China sharing resources with other countries, China 
refuses to cooperate with the other nations. It prefers to treat In the case of the Mekong 
River, China has adopted the Harmon doctrine, a doctrine that states that upstream states 
have absolute sovereignty over the water while it is within their territory and that 
downstream states have no right to object to the usage by upstream states, to include 
diverting most any amount of water it sees fit, and that the government of the 
downstream state has no right to object.175176 China's adoption of this can be seen in its 
actions. Firstly, it's communications with the lower countries on the Mekong are poor and 
this offers the lower countries little opportunity to address concerns that they may have 
with Chinese projects on the river.177 Second, their develop plans are treated only as a 
national issue and only address the effects that will happen within Chinese borders.178 
Finally, at this point China is the only country to have dammed the main flow of the 
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Mekong, with plans for further damming in order to create a cascade of up to 8 dams for 
hydro-electric power, and are considering a project to redirect some of the waters from 
the Mekong into the Yangtze River.179180 These development projects have been done 
with little inquiry into the effects it will have to downstream nations.181 This has caused 
concerns among many of countries downstream of China. This has led several leaders to 
call for greater cooperation, particularly Vietnam and Cambodia. In addressing the 
Second Greater Mekong Sub-region Summit, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister stated 
that, “Overall exploitation of the Mekong river basin needs to take into account the 
legitimate interests of the countries in the region and should not compromise the interests 
of those countries situated at the lower part of the basin.”182 
Though there are other sources of tension from planned development projects on the 
Mekong River, China's plans have caused the most concern and tensions. China has 
worked to effectively nationalize the issue of their development projects in an attempt to 
marginalize the concerns of the other riparian states. Driven by their subscription to the 
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absolute sovereignty that is prescribed in the Harmon Doctrine, this is likely to remain a 
source of tension between China and the downstream nations of the Mekong River. 
Brahmaputra River Dispute 
The Brahmaputra River is another major river that has its headwaters in Tibet. The 
Chinese share this river with the India and Bangladesh. This river has been identified as 
another possible addition to the North-South Water Diversion Project, which is a project 
that the Chinese government has undertaken to divert the Yangtze River to the north at 
three different points.183  
Much like their dealings with the counties of the Mekong River Commission, China 
views any projects that they undertake on the river as a matter of national sovereignty and 
refuses to consult or cooperate with the downstream nations. This is most readily seen in 
the incident where India discovered the construction of a Chinese construction of a dam 
on the Brahmaputra at Zhangmu. This presents a major problem for India, as it draws 
nearly 30 percent of its power from the Brahmaputra.184 Currently the only agreement 
between the two countries pertaining to this river is an “expert-level-agreement” to share 
flood data between the two countries, an agreement that India has attempted to expand, 
but has had no luck in doing so.185  
As with Mekong River, China's strict views on the status of resources is seen in its 
dealings on Brahmaputra River. Their own issues with water scarcity are viewed as 
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trumping the needs of downstream nations. Thus this view is fueling the disputes that 
China is having with India over utilization of the Brahmaputra River. 
Conclusion 
 These case studies demonstrate that there is a clear relationship between a nation's views 
on sovereignty and their behavior with regard to transboundary resource disputes. Most 
nations, regardless of their differences in their economic and /or military power have 
worked ensure equitably opportunity for other nations, with whom they share resources, 
to exploit their resources. This view has now been codified in several United Nations 
Conventions, the most notable of which is the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea. However, China's actions, stemming from their views on sovereignty, stand out 
in stark contrast to the rest of the world and are now in violation of international law. 
Despite the softened approach that China has taken to dealing with its neighbors and its 
attempts to appear neighborly, China routinely violates any agreements nations and 
continues to assert that it has rights to exploit any resources within its territory as it sees 
fit and without regard to the effect it may have on other nations ability to exploit their 
resources or receive their fair share of these shared resources. 
Despite this very strict interpretation of its rights, and by extension the rights of other 
nations to exert sovereignty over the natural resources within its territory, China has 
taken a different view in regard to the Arctic. Unlike with the South and East China Seas, 
some in China are pushing for an interpretation of the Arctic issue to define the Arctic in 




found would be equitably distributed.186 They have also made calls for the A5 Nations 
(Russia, Norway, Canada, United States and Denmark) to balance their economic 
interests with those of the international community.187 This however runs counter to their 
current policy with regards to territorial claims and the rights of a country to exploit the 
resources within their territory. This difference in policy was identified by Wright as a 
“thorny diplomatic quandary” because of the nature of their own claims.188 Unfortunately 
for them, their current position is likely untenable because it would a best weaken, if not 
fully negate, their claims within the South and East China Seas, which they regard as a 
serious strategic issue. This could lead to a softening of their views toward the Arctic and 
lead them to either deepen ties with the A5 Nations or to attempt to exploit fissures 
within the nations, such as the conflict over the Northwest Passage between Canada and 
the United States, to forestall any decisions that they would not regard as favorable to 
Chinese interests. 
This situation could be become exacerbated by China's role in the world. As an emerging 
power, there are doubtlessly other nations examining China's actions to gauge their own 
behavior as they attempt to emerge as regional and international powers. If China's view 
on actions, based on their absolutist view on sovereignty, are allowed to continue 
unchecked, this could lead other nations to believe that they should adopt this view and 
the behaviors that come with it. Though is not a guaranteed recipe for future conflicts, as 
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we have seen with China, it could increase tensions in any region where a state adopts 




















Chapter 3: Investigating Chinese Aid and Its Relationship to Natural Resources in 
Africa 
Introduction 
Since 1994, China has increasingly become a larger player in providing development aid 
to countries around the world, particularly in Africa. They currently only play a small 
role in the total amount of development aid that is being distributed, however, Chinese 
aid is now presenting a challenge to the aid and aid policies of Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that has many people worried. China's 
aid policies have been accused of serving a wide range of functions from propping up 
autocratic regimes to subverting policies of good governance. 
The Chinese, due to their views on sovereignty, do not require their recipient countries to 
make institutional changes as a requirement for receiving development assistance from 
them. However, many people in the West have begun to view the Chinese model with 
suspicion. In many cases the countries targeted for Chinese aid are resource rich, 
particularly in oil. This has led to instances, such as with Chinese aid to Angola, in which 
the Chinese government received repayment for loans via mineral or resource 
repayments, or preferential rights given to Chinese companies to exploit the recipient 
country's natural resources. This apparent targeting of resource-rich countries and their 
inclusion of natural resources and other benefits to the government have lead some in the 
West to compare Chinese aid programs with imperialism. This is denied by the Chinese 




In this paper I will begin by defining what China considers development aid and its 
contrasts to development aid provided by the OECD countries. Then, using China's own 
definition of what it considers development aid, I will examine whether or not China's aid 
is truly targeted toward gaining resource concessions from resource-rich countries. 
Literature Review 
Because of the emerging and somewhat controversial nature of Chinese developmental 
aid, most people view it in relation to the developmental aid provided by the OECD. The 
OECD defines developmental aid as financing targeted at fostering economic growth that 
is concessional in nature and includes a grant of at least 25 percent.189 In many cases, the 
OECD's developmental aid is also tied to either requested policy changes targeted at 
improving governance or human rights.190 Lastly, OECD developmental aid normally 
comes in the form of direct budget support, poverty reduction or sector-wide 
approaches.191 
For the most part, Chinese development aid shares the basic characteristics of OECD 
development aid. 
China's developmental aid is also concessional in nature and includes grants, zero-interest 
loans and concessional (low, fixed interest) loans.192 There are, however some rather 
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stark contrasts. The Chinese do not use the same system for classifying their development 
aid and therefore include aid that goes towards joint ventures between Chinese companies 
and those in developing nations and certain forms of military aid.193 Chinese aid projects 
also have a requirement for mutual benefit, meaning that an aid project will have a 
Chinese company assigned to it and that company will be encouraged to import as much 
of its resources and labor from China as possible.194 The final difference between Chinese 
aid and that of the OECD is that Chinese aid is generally targeted at specific projects vice 
the large sector-wide programs of the OECD.195 These differences in the developmental 
aid programs of the OECD and China have led many to question whether current Chinese 
development aid should be classified as development aid.196  
Despite the question of whether their development aid truly meets the definition of true 
development aid, the Chinese classify it as such. But this still leaves one of the biggest 
questions concerning their aid left to answer, are they using their aid as a way to obtain 
natural resources from developing countries? Studies on this question have been divided 
in their findings, with some confirming the fact that Chinese development aid is targeted 
at extracting natural resources and others finding that their aid is either not targeted 
specifically at extracting resources or that other factors play a larger role in determining 
who receives Chinese development aid. 
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The theory that Chinese developmental aid is being used to target resources has garnered 
a number of supporters. Yun Sun points to the fact that Chinese “tied aid,” which is often 
combined with direct investments, generally lead to either benefits for Chinese 
companies who will receive contracts as part of the deal or will be backed by the natural 
resources of the recipient.197 
Despite this evidence, there are many who believe that Chinese developmental aid is not 
targeted at extracting resources, but that if it is targeted; natural resources are not the 
primary driver behind which countries China selects to give developmental aid. Dreher 
and Fuchs find that, though economic interests play a certain role in China's selection of 
recipient countries, political factors play a larger role in the countries they select.198 
Particular factors they point out are that countries that have similar voting patterns to 
China and countries that don't officially recognize Taiwan receive larger aid shares.199 In 
her book “The Gift of the Dragon,” Bräutigam states that all countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa receive some form of developmental aid under the “One China” policy.200 Unlike 
Yun Sun, she finds that there is no preferential treatment given to resource-rich 
countries.201 Though she goes on to admit that resources do play into Chinese aid, China 
does not view this as an opportunity to extract resources as it does an opportunity to 
create mutually beneficial business.202 
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It is clear to see that there are multiple and possibly interrelated factors that determine 
which countries receive Chinese developmental aid and how much they receive. The role 
of resources is particularly troubling because of the fact that resource exports account for 
the majority of the gross domestic product (GDP) for some countries. Further research 
into how these factors are related and which one truly plays the largest role will be 
needed to make a final determination. 
Hypothesis 
China has worked to portray their programs for development aid as superior to those of 
Western aid donors because of their respect for the sovereignty of the recipient nation. 
Though their programs do respect the recipient country's sovereignty by refusing to 
impose requirements that would require changes to the governing institutions of the 
recipient country, Chinese development aid programs in Africa appear to be a mechanism 
for gaining concessions for natural resources from African nations.  
Methodology 
Because of the differences in Chinese and Western aid, and to remove the question of 
what is and is not aid, I will be including any developmental aid that meets Chinese 
standards for being classified as developmental aid. I will then examine China's aid 
relationships with five African countries, Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Sudan and South Sudan, Ghana and Nigeria and all have a body of literature concerning 
the nature of China’s aid involvement in the country. Of these countries, Angola, Nigeria 
and Sudan possess oil and the Democratic Republic of the Congo possesses several 




is not classified as resource rich. I will then run each country's aid packages through a 
series of tests. First, I will examine whether the country is regarded as being resource-
rich, and if so what is their chief resource. Next, I will examine whether there were 
resource-related repayment or concessions included in the negotiation for the aid project. 
Resource-related concessions will instances where a recipient country's natural resources 
were used as collateral, repayment for a loan or where Chinese companies received 
preferential treatment in being allowed to exploit the recipient country's natural resources. 
Countries who meet both of these criteria will be considered evidence supporting the 
hypothesis and if four or more of these countries meet both of the requirements, I will 
accept the hypothesis. 
Data 
Angola 
Angola is currently one of the fastest growing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Much of 
this economic boom is due to the Angolan oil industry. In 2014, Angola produced 1.75 
million barrels per day (bpd) of crude and other liquids, with oil accounting for 1.75 
million bpd in 2014, making it second only to Nigeria in Sub-Saharan Africa.203 Of the 
1.75 million bpd produced over that time 1.65 million bpd were exported with China 
accounting for 49 percent of the share.204  Oil and natural gas account for nearly 52 
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percent of their economy205  and accounted for around 97 percent of Angola's income 
from exports in 2012.206  
China's development relationship with Angola began in 2003 in the wake of the Angolan 
Civil War and has become so extensive that it is often referred to as the “Angola 
Model.”207 Initially, Angola had sought an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. 
However, the two sides were unable to agree on the terms and the negotiations fell apart 
because the Angolan government did not want to accept the conditions put on the loans 
by the IMF.208 At that point, China stepped in and between 2003 and 2010 offered Angola 
$10 billion in low interest loans with reasonable repayment schedules for their 
reconstruction and development at a rate of Libor + 1.5%.209210 These loans were offered 
to Angola with fewer conditions and were backed by Angolan oil.211 This loan guarantees 
China a supply of 10,000 bpd from Angola as part of their repayment.212 In addition to the 
obvious oil backing of the loan, there is also a certain amount of speculation that Chinese 
oil companies have received preferential treatment in their bids to exploit an Angolan oil 
fields.213 The most glaring example of this is the purchase of 50 percent of Block 18 by 
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Sinopec, which corresponded with the release of the first tranche of Angola's 
development aid and overrode previous purchase agreements with American and Indian 
oil companies.214 
In looking at the situation in Angola, it appears that China's developmental aid is targeted 
at aiding it in extracting Angolan oil. Angola is an oil rich country, thus meeting the first 
criteria. Along with this, the Chinese have ensured a 10,000 bpd supply from Angola as 
part of the backing for their development aid. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Despite the fact that it is one of the poorest countries in the world, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (D.R. Congo) is one of the richest in natural resources. Currently, 
agriculture remains the primary industry, due in large part to mismanagement by mining 
companies.215 However, current estimates, based on a United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP) report, are that there could be up to $24 trillion worth of copper, cobalt 
and coltran, which are all important resources of information based economies.216 D.R. 
Congo is estimated to have 10 percent of the world's supply of copper and one-third of 
the supply of cobalt.217 
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As of 2007, when it was originally signed,218 China's aid deal with D.R. Congo is its 
largest aid project on the continent of Africa to date.219 As part of this developmental aid 
deal, the Chinese have pledged $6 billion to D.R. Congo for infrastructure projects that 
will result in the construction of new roads, railways, hospitals and universities.220 As 
repayment for the development loans, China is guaranteed 10 million tons of copper and 
400,000 tons of cobalt.221 Additionally, the profits from the mine, which is a joint venture 
with two Chinese companies, will be used to pay off the loan.222 Many view this project 
as unfairly benefiting China, because up to half of the wealth generated will belong to 
China.223  
Despite the objections of many outside of the deal, China classifies this as aid and is in 
keeping with their requirement of mutual benefit. D.R. Congo is clearly a resource rich 
country that possesses resources that would be of great value to China. Their aid deal 
with D.R. Congo clearly uses resources as a means of repaying that loan and the long-
term nature of the joint development will ensure a supply of these resources into the 
future. 
Sudan and South Sudan 
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Sudan and South Sudan, if considered combined, are the third largest producer of oil in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, behind Nigeria and Angola.224 They are also suspected of containing 
significant mineral wealth, but this has not been confirmed due to a lack in exploration.225 
Sudan's economy has historically been based on agriculture, though oil has become an 
increasingly important part of the economy. As of January 2014, there are a projected 3.5 
billion barrels of reserves in South Sudan with an additional 1.5 billion barrels in 
Sudan.226 At its peak in 2011 the combined fields produced 337,000 bpd, however the 
fields have been well below that level since and in 2013 produced 133,000 bpd for 
export, 86 percent of which went to China, accounting for 2 percent of its oil imports that 
year.227 In 2012, revenues from oil exports accounted for 27 percent of Sudan’s total 
government revenues, though that was down from 60 percent the two preceding years, 
however, it accounted for 98 percent of South Sudan’s revenues following its 
independence.228 This shift has caused growth rates of up to 9 percent, which makes it 
one of the fastest growing economies in the region.229 
In terms of development aid, China has had a long standing relationship with Sudan. In 
the wake of the civil war, China has worked to maintain relationships with both North 
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and South Sudan. The most aid China has agreed is an $8 billion development deal with 
South Sudan, which acquired much of the oil when the two countries split. The aid will 
provide money for roads, hydroelectric power and agriculture and may include the 
construction of a new pipeline that does not go through North Sudan.230 Past development 
aid deals, predating the split of the two countries, were targeted at similar projects to the 
South Sudan deal, such as roads and electricity and required that petroleum guarantees be 
used as a means of providing security on the loans provided.231 
As with Angola, China's development aid to North and South Sudan appears to be 
targeted at gaining concessions for Sudanese oil. These oil fields place them as one of the 
most important suppliers in Sub-Saharan Africa despite the fact that they are only 
classified as modest in size. China's past and present deals have targeted the oil rich 
South and have specifically required that oil be used as a guarantee in the past to ensure 
their receipt of this oil. 
Ghana 
Unlike many West African countries, Ghana has a rich and diverse set of natural 
resources that includes gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite.232 Though none of these 
are considered strategic resources, Ghana may become the focus of increased attention as 
they begin to increase production in the Jubilee oil field, which was discovered in 2007 
and is operating at a production capacity of 99,000 bpd as of 2013, and seek to 
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commercialize the oil production there.233 Despite these resources, Ghana's economy is 
primarily agricultural, comprising 55 percent of the country's gross domestic product 
(GDP) with cash crops amounting to approximately 33 percent of Ghana's export 
revenue.234 
Despite the lack of strategic resources, China has provided development aid to Ghana. It 
is noted, however, that China's role in development in Ghana is minor compared to other 
aid donors.235 The two governments have signed 6 deals which have led to development 
projects in Ghana ranging from improvements to the telecommunications infrastructure, 
to construction of the Bui Hydroelectric Dam, to construction of landing sites in fishing 
communities.236 Though not all of the projects taken on by the Chinese involved resource 
concessions of one form or another, the Bui hydroelectric dam, where construction began 
in January 2008,237 and fishing projects did. As part of the repayment plan for the 
hydroelectric dam, Ghana was required to sell cocoa to China at market value as part of 
their effort to increase chocolate consumption in China.238 China's construction of the 
landing sites has also lead to resource-related benefits. These projects have increased 
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their interest in the country's fishing industry which has therefore opened the door for 
Chinese companies and the ability to conduct off-shore exploration.239 
China's development aid to Ghana would suggest that they are not targeting resources. 
Though Ghana has a diverse range of resources, it is still regarded as resource poor and 
none of its resources are considered strategic. However, China has used some of its 
development projects in Ghana to receive resources concessions, cocoa and fish. The 
discovery of oil will make Ghana an interesting case study in the future to gauge whether 
China's interest in development aid increased and if resource concessions, specifically oil, 
were increased. 
Nigeria 
Nigeria possesses the largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa. Their current oil 
reserves are estimated at 37 billion barrels of oil reserves as of January 2015, making 
Nigeria second only to Libya in projected oil reserves for an African Nation.240 At its 
peak operating capacity in 2005, they were producing 2.44 million bpd, however 
production has declined since then with production at 2.4 million bpd in 2014.241 During 
2014, Nigeria exported 2.05 million bpd. Its primary customers were countries in Europe 
and Asia, however their primary Asian customers were India and Indonesia, China’s 
share of the market was less than 6 percent.242 The oil industry accounts for 
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approximately 98 percent of export income and 83 percent of the government's 
income.243 
China's has had an extensive development aid program with Nigeria. In 2014, they 
pledged an additional $12 billion, in the form of a line of credit which increased its total 
aid to $30 billion, as part of development aid to the country for infrastructure and other 
projects.244 Much of China's aid was tied to the “Oil for Infrastructure” program of the 
Obsanjo administration, which began in 2006 with the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding.245 China's role in this program was a $2.5 billion loan for rehabilitation of 
the Lagos-Kano railway system, which resulted in the rehabilitation of nearly 700 miles 
of track by February 2013,246 and a hydroelectric dam, where the president has promised 
in January 2015 that dredging will begin soon,247 for which they would receive right of 
first refusal on a series of oil blocks that the government was putting up for auction.248  
As the country with the largest oil reserves in Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria definitely 
meets the criteria of being a resource-rich country, particularly because its primary 
resource is oil. On top of this, Nigeria ranks first amongst Sub-Saharan countries in terms 
of the aid it receives from China. Despite the fact that the “Oil for Infrastructure” 
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program was a Nigerian invention, the Chinese still took part in the program as part of 
their foreign aid to Nigeria, thus contributing to the argument that they are using their 
development aid to target natural resources. 
Conclusion 
Contrary to what I expected to see in the hypothesis, China's aid seems to be spread 
throughout countries regardless of their resource-richness, as was seen with Ghana where 
oil was only recently discovered. Though this does not disprove the theory that China is 
seeking to gain resource concessions with its aid, two of the cases set the stage for further 
potential research into the subject. The first of these is the discovery of oil in Ghana. 
Given that Ghana possessed no strategic resources, prior to the discovery of its oil fields, 
this could offer an interesting case study to examine whether Chinese development aid to 
Ghana increased in the wake of the oil discovery. In much a similar way, the second 
potential case study would be in North and South Sudan in the event of discovery of other 
key strategic resources. 
It does appear, however, that China does seek resource concessions from the recipient 
countries. These concessions come in the form of resources being used as collateral, as 
direct repayment for loans or in preferential treatment given to Chinese companies in bids 
for resources contracts. In all five of the cases seen, China sought some sort of resource 
concession, be it oil from Nigeria, Angola and Sudan, copper and cobalt from D.R. 
Congo or even cocoa from Ghana. Given the low level of development in these countries 




national income, this could extreme damage to the economies, with no guarantee of 
growth as a result of the Chinese development projects.  
China’s respect for the sovereignty of other countries in the development aid program has 
set it up as a challenger to the Western model. Their lack of requirements for institutional 
reforms, unlike Western aid, appeals to many African nations who regard the West with 
suspicion based on their colonial past. This mistrust, which is also present outside of 
Africa in other former colonial nations, could allow China use this an enticement to other 
former colonial nations. So despite this respect for sovereignty, China's aid program is 
designed to ensure that it receives just as much benefit out of the aid disbursement as the 
recipient country. One of the chief ways that China ensures it receives these benefits is by 
requiring the use of natural resources as a method of repayment or collateral. In doing 
this, China has succeeded in turning their development aid into a method of resource 














As we have seen, China has a well-defined view on sovereignty that is applied 
consistently throughout their dealings with other nations as well as international 
organizations. China has taken a classical view of sovereignty which gives a government 
absolute power within its borders and protection from outside interference in a country’s 
affairs unless that aid is requested. However in a number of areas, certain aspects of this 
view have come into conflict with current Western views on sovereignty which promotes 
a view on sovereignty that promotes values such as equitable access to shared resources 
and the now views sovereignty through the lens of the responsibilities that a sovereign 
government has toward its people, as evidenced through the creation of RtoP. 
Despite these differences in view, China’s current strategy appears to be one in which 
they pursue an aggressive stance on sovereignty when the relative balance of power is in 
their favor. Thus we see them take an aggressive stance when dealing with other 
countries in the region where their only major challengers for power are India and Japan, 
with whom they are on a relatively equal footing. This would also explain their less 
aggressive actions toward many of the major international organizations, whose power 
could pose a threat to their view of sovereignty because these organizations hold an 
advantage in their relative power to China because they offer China prestige through its 
membership in them and because they are largely backed by the developed countries of 




views to more closely fit with Western views, while still working to subvert actions that 
they believe infringe on sovereignty. We have this behavior in their interactions with the 
WTO, where they have taken on the behaviors of certain major trading powers, such as 
the United States. The second option would be take an aggressive stance toward the 
Western countries and organizations as the difference in relative power shrinks. One 
manner of doing this would be for China to wait until they possess the relative power 
difference between them and the West has been essentially negated. Another avenue for 
this aggressive action would be for China to find common cause with other developing 
nations, such as Russia, India or Brazil, to further close the gap in relative power, thus 
allowing to at a minimum counter these new Western views or to assert their own. An 
example of this already exists, in which China and Russia worked together to block 
humanitarian intervention in Syria. Further examination of how China is reacting to 
Western countries and international organizations to identify whether they intend to 
continue their current behaviors or whether they are seeking to more actively oppose any 
actions they view as infringing on sovereignty. Particular care should be taken to note 
whether they are seeking common cause with other countries while they are taking more 
aggressive actions. 
China will also face a major test of its views on sovereignty as more decisions are made 
about the Arctic. Their current policy, stating that the Arctic should be treated as a global 
commons, stands in stark contrast to their views toward the South and East China Seas. 
Continuing to hold to their policy about the Arctic will damage their positions in the 




prevent them from having a say in the manner in which the resources there are 
distributed. Further study will be necessary to determine if China is willing to back down 
from one of their most clearly stated positions, particularly one that could damage their 
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